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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
How Fast Do Wages Adjust to Human-Capital Productivity? Dynamic 
Panel-Data Evidence from Europe and the United States 
 
The standard human-capital model is based on the assumption that the 
observed wage of an individual is equal to the monetary value of the individual 
net human-capital productivity, the so-called net potential wage. We argue that 
this assumption is rejected by micro data for Belgium, Denmark and Finland. 
The empirical evidence supports a dynamic approach to the Mincer equation 
where no equality is imposed but an adjustment between observed and 
potential earnings is allowed to take place over time. Controlling for regressors’ 
endogeneity and individual unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a dynamic 
panel-data wage equation and provide measures of the speed of adjustment in 
Belgium, Denmark and Finland. Further, we elaborate on the implications of a 
dynamic approach to the Mincer equation for the computation of the return to 
schooling, including the implication that the return is not independent of labor-
market experience, as suggested by Heckman et al. (2005) and Belzil (2007). 
Finally, we show that a dynamic wage equation can be seen as the solution of a 
decentralized wagebargaining model and argue that this model can fit both 
European and US data better than a simple adjustment model but requires 
more theoretical assumptions. 
 
 
Keywords: Mincer Equation, Wages, Human Capital. 
JEL codes: I21, J31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corrado Andini 
Departamento de Gestão e Economia 
Universidade da Madeira 
Edifício da Penteada 
Caminho da Penteada 
9000 - 390 Funchal 
 
How Fast Do Wages Adjust to Human-Capital Productivity?  
Dynamic Panel-Data Evidence from Europe and the United States   
 
 
 
 
 
Corrado Andini  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The standard human-capital model is based on the assumption that the observed wage of 
an individual is equal to the monetary value of the individual net human-capital 
productivity, the so-called net potential wage. We argue that this assumption is rejected 
by micro data for Belgium, Denmark and Finland. The empirical evidence supports a 
dynamic approach to the Mincer equation where no equality is imposed but an 
adjustment between observed and potential earnings is allowed to take place over time. 
Controlling for regressors’ endogeneity and individual unobserved heterogeneity, we 
estimate a dynamic panel-data wage equation and provide measures of the speed of 
adjustment in Belgium, Denmark and Finland. Further, we elaborate on the implications 
of a dynamic approach to the Mincer equation for the computation of the return to 
schooling, including the implication that the return is not independent of labor-market 
experience, as suggested by Heckman et al. (2005) and Belzil (2007). Finally, we show 
that a dynamic wage equation can be seen as the solution of a decentralized wage-
bargaining model and argue that this model can fit both European and US data better 
than a simple adjustment model but requires more theoretical assumptions.         
 
Keywords: Mincer Equation, Wages, Human Capital. 
JEL codes: I21, J31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
Financial support from the European Commission (EDWIN project, HPSE-CT-2002-00108) is gratefully 
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.        
 1
1. Introduction 
 
In the standard human-capital model proposed by Mincer (1974), the logarithm of the 
hourly observed earnings of an individual is explained by schooling years, potential 
labor-market experience and experience squared. This section presents the theoretical 
foundations of the standard Mincerian equation as reported by Heckman et al. (2003). 
Therefore, we make no claim of originality at this stage and mainly aim at helping the 
reader with notations and terminology adopted in the next sections.  
Mincer argues that potential earnings today depend on investments in human capital 
made yesterday. Denoting potential earnings at time t as tE , Mincer assumes that an 
individual invests in human capital a share tk  of his potential earnings with a return of 
tr  in each period t. Therefore we have: 
 
(1) )kr1(EE ttt1t +=+     
 
which, after repeated substitution, becomes: 
 
(2) ∏−
=
+=
1t
0j
0jjt E)kr1(E  
 
or alternatively: 
 
(3) ∑−
=
++=
1t
0j
jj0t )kr1ln(ElnEln . 
 
Under the assumptions that:  
 
• schooling is the number of years s spent in full-time investment 
( 1k...k 1s0 === − ), 
 
• the return to schooling in terms of potential earnings is constant over time 
( β=== −1s0 r...r ), 
 
• the return to the post-schooling investment in terms of potential earnings is 
constant over time ( λ=== −1ts r...r ),  
 
we can write expression (3) in the following manner: 
 
(4) ∑−
=
λ++β++=
1t
sj
j0t )k1ln()1ln(sElnEln  
 
which yields: 
 
(5) ∑−
=
λ+β+≈
1t
sj
j0t ksElnEln  
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for small values of β , λ  and k 1. 
In order to build up a link between potential earnings and labor-market experience z, 
Mincer assumes that the post-schooling investment linearly decreases over time, that is: 
 
(6) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −η=+ T
z1k zs  
 
where 0stz ≥−= , T is the last year of the working life and )1,0(∈η .  
Therefore, using (6), we can re-arrange expression (5) and get: 
 
(7) 20t zT2
z
T2
sElnEln ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ηλ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ηλ+ηλ+β+ηλ−≈ . 
 
Then, by subtracting (6) from (7), we obtain an expression for net potential earnings, i.e. 
potential earnings net of post-schooling investment costs: 
 
(8) 20t zT2
z
TT2
sEln
T
z1Eln ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ηλ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ η+ηλ+ηλ+β+η−ηλ−≈⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −η−  
 
which can also be written as: 
 
(9) 2t zzsnpeln φ+δ+β+α≈  
 
where ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −η−=
T
z1Elnnpeln tt , η−ηλ−=α 0Eln , TT2
η+ηλ+ηλ=δ  and 
T2
ηλ−=φ .  
Finally, assuming that observed earnings are equal to net potential earnings at any time t 
(a key-assumption, as we will argue in the next section): 
 
(10) tt npelnwln =  
 
and, using expression (9), we get the standard Mincer equation: 
 
(11) 2t zzswln φ+δ+β+α≈ . 
 
The reminder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic adjustment 
model where assumption (10) is relaxed. Section 3 discusses the implications of the 
adjustment model for the computation of wage return to schooling. Section 4 shows that 
a dynamic wage equation can be seen as the solution of a simple wage-bargaining 
model. Section 5 presents some extensions of the empirical evidence proposed in the 
previous sections. Section 6 summarizes the main results of the paper in the light of the 
existing literature on human-capital regressions.      
 
2. Adjustment model  
 
Following Heckman et al. (2003), the standard Mincerian framework seems to be 
characterized by two main features. First, it provides an explanation why the logarithm 
                                                 
1 Note that the symbol of equality )(=  in expression (4) becomes a symbol of rough equality )(≈  in 
expression (5). It happens because, if x is closed to zero, then x)x1ln( ≈+ .     
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of the net potential earnings of an individual at time zst +=  can be approximately 
represented as a function of s and z, i.e. expression (9). Second, it is based on the 
assumption that, at any time st ≥ , the logarithm of the observed wage of an individual 
is equal to the monetary value of his net human-capital productivity, measured by his 
net potential wage, i.e. assumption (10). 
This paper does not question expression (9) and focuses on assumption (10). On the 
lines of Flannery and Rangan (2006), we argue that assumption (10) can be replaced by 
a more flexible assumption. Particularly, observed earnings can be seen as dynamically 
adjusting to net potential earnings, according to the following simple adjustment model:  
 
(12) )wlnnpe(lnwlnwln 1tt1tt −− −ρ=−                  
 
where [ ]1,0∈ρ  measures the speed of adjustment.  
If 1=ρ , then assumption (10) holds, observed earnings are equal (adjust) to net 
potential earnings at time t (within period t), and the standard Mincerian model (11) 
holds. If instead 0=ρ , then observed earnings are constant over time, always equal to 
the labor-market entry earnings swln , and do not adjust at all to variations of net 
potential earnings. In general, when the speed of adjustment is neither zero nor one, 
replacing expression (9) into (12) gives:  
 
(13) ( )21tt zzswln)1(wln φ+δ+β+αρ+ρ−≈ −                                       
 
or alternatively: 
 
(14) 24321t10t zzswlnwln υ+υ+υ+υ+υ≈ −                                                                       
 
where ρα=υ0 , ρ−=υ 11 , ρβ=υ2 , ρδ=υ3  and ρφ=υ4 . 
Expression (14) is a dynamic version of the Mincer equation, which we label the 
adjustment model. Note that, when individual-level longitudinal data are available, the 
complement to one of the speed of adjustment ( ρ−1 ) can be estimated and the theory 
underlying (14) can be tested. The main requirement for the theory to be consistent with 
the data is to find that the coefficient 1υ  is significantly different from zero. 
Table 1 presents estimates based on model (14). We use OLS and GMM techniques to 
explore data on male workers (we restrict to males in order to minimize sample-
selection problems), aged between 18 and 65, from the European Community 
Household Panel for Belgium, Denmark and Finland. The Appendix contains a detailed 
description of the sample statistics and describes how the variables of model (14) are 
obtained from the original ECHP variables.  
Our preferred estimates in Table 1 are the GMM-SYS estimates, accounting for the 
endogeneity, individual heterogeneity and time effects (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In 
our preferred estimates, the coefficient ρ−=υ 11  is statistically different from zero and 
estimated at 0.218, 0.335 and 0.420 in Finland, Belgium and Denmark, respectively. 
This implies that the speed of adjustment ρ  is statistically different from one and 
estimated at 0.782, 0.665 and 0.580 in Finland, Belgium and Denmark, respectively. So, 
the main empirical result is that the observed wage at time t is not equal (does not 
adjust) to the monetary value of the individual net human-capital productivity (the net 
potential wage) at time t (within period t) since no country has a speed of adjustment 
either equal or closed to one. Hence, assumption (10) in the standard Mincerian model 
is rejected by the ECHP data for Belgium, Denmark and Finland. 
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Note that all standard tests are passed, although it is likely that extended versions of the 
adjustment model, with additional covariates, would probably fit the data better than the 
simple model (14). As expected, the OLS estimator over-estimates the autoregressive 
coefficient while the GMM-SYS estimates without year effects are not reliable because 
the corresponding model that does not pass either the Hansen J over-identification test 
(Finland) or the Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorrelation test2 (Denmark), or both 
(Belgium).         
As one would reasonably expect, due to different labor-market institutions, the speed of 
adjustment of observed hourly wages to human-capital productivity is heterogeneous 
across the three European countries considered in this study. Particularly, Finland is the 
country with the highest speed of adjustment, while Denmark is the country with the 
lowest speed. 
The next section analyses the implications for the computation of the return to schooling 
deriving from the adoption of a dynamic approach to the Mincer equation. However, 
before moving to the next section, we would like to stress that model (14) has an 
additional interesting feature which will not be further explored in this paper. 
Particularly, it can be used to further justify some macroeconomic studies estimating the 
impact of schooling on GDP growth3 and some microeconomic studies that estimate the 
impact of human capital on wage growth4. Indeed, by subtracting 1twln −  at both sides 
of expression (14), we get a version of model (14) where schooling and labor-market 
experience affect wage growth, i.e. 24321t01tt zzswlnwlnwln υ+υ+υ+ρ−υ≈− −− .  
 
3. Implications for the return to schooling  
 
This section shows that a dynamic version of the Mincer equation implies that the return 
to schooling in terms of observed earnings is not independent of labor-market 
experience. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Heckman 
et. al. (2005) and Belzil (2007). In addition, it is shown that the return to schooling in 
terms of net potential earnings, provided by the standard Mincer equation, can also be 
computed using its dynamic version.  
 
3.1 Static return to schooling in terms of net potential earnings 
To begin, we find of interest stressing that the total return to schooling in the static 
model (11) is given by the following expression: 
 
(15) β≈∂
∂=∂
∂ +
s
wln
s
wln zst  
 
and is constant over the working life, meaning independent of labor-market experience 
z. Further, because of assumption (10), the return to schooling in terms of observed 
earnings and the one in terms of net potential earnings coincide5.  
                                                 
2 This test has been introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
3 See Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a review.  
 
4 See Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) for a review. Another interesting contribution on this issue is provided 
by Connolly and Gottschalk (2006).  
 
5 See expression (9). 
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We label β  as static return to schooling in terms of net potential earnings and show, in 
subsection 3.3, that our interpretation of β  in terms of net potential rather than observed 
earnings is the most appropriate.   
 
3.2 Returns to schooling in terms of observed earnings  
The dynamic model (14) allows obtaining the evolution of the schooling return over the 
entire working life. For instance, at time s, expression (14) can be written as follows: 
 
(16) 21ss 00swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈ −  
 
where 1sw −  is the minimum wage
6 at time 1s − , assumed to be independent of 
schooling years. Therefore, the return to schooling at time s, i.e. when an individual 
enters the labor market, is given by: 
 
(17) ρβ≈∂
∂=β
s
wln)0( s . 
 
Analogously, at time 1s + , expression (14) can be written as follows: 
 
(18) 2s1s 11swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈+  
 
and the total return to schooling is given by: 
 
(19)  )1(
s
wln)1( 1s ρ−ρβ+ρβ≈∂
∂=β + . 
 
At time 2s + , expression (14) is as follows: 
 
(20) 21s2s 22swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈ ++  
 
and the total return to schooling is given by: 
 
(21) 22s )1()1(
s
wln)2( ρ−ρβ+ρ−ρβ+ρβ≈∂
∂=β + . 
 
Therefore, at time zs + , the return to schooling in terms of observed earnings is given 
by the following expression: 
 
(22) [ ]Z32zs )1(....)1()1()1(1
s
wln)z( ρ−++ρ−+ρ−+ρ−+ρβ≈∂
∂=β + , 
 
                                                 
6 If current observed earnings depend on both past observed earnings and current net potential earnings, 
as suggested by model (14), it is easy to see that, at time s, i.e. at labor-market entry, the reference past 
wage for the representative individual cannot be the wage at time 1s −  because this wage is not observed 
(the individual is still enrolled in school at time 1s − ). Therefore, we find reasonable to assume that, for 
an individual at labor-market entry, the reference past wage is the minimum wage at time 1s − . So, at 
time s, the individual tries to obtain a salary that is above the minimum wage as a reward to his human-
capital investment (the schooling years accumulated at time s). Note that considering the minimum wage 
at time s rather than at time 1s −  does not change the argument.         
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and is, in general, dependent of labor-market experience z. 
Clearly, at the end of the working life, the total return in terms of observed earnings is 
as follows: 
 
(23) [ ]T32Ts )1(....)1()1()1(1
s
wln)T( ρ−++ρ−+ρ−+ρ−+ρβ≈∂
∂=β + . 
 
3.3 Dynamic return to schooling in terms of net potential earnings 
The return in expression (22) is, in general, lower than the return in expression (15), 
although the first converges to the latter as labor-market experience z increases. Indeed, 
for a value of )1,0(∈ρ , the following expression holds: 
 
(24) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
ρ−−ρβ≈β=∞β ∞→ )1(1
1)z(lim)(
z
.  
 
Therefore, the dynamic model (14) is able to provide a measure of β  comparable7 with 
expression (15). We label )(∞β  as dynamic return to schooling in terms of net potential 
earnings.  
Expression (24) helps to show that our interpretation of β  in terms of net potential 
rather than observed earnings is the most appropriate because nobody can live and work 
forever. To the extent of T being a finite number, the return to schooling in terms of 
observed earnings )z(β  can never be equal to β , but in the very special case of 1=ρ .  
 
3.4 Final remarks 
It is easy to prove that the following inequalities hold: 
 
(25) β<β<β<β )T()z()0(  
 
for every z and T such that ∞<<< Tz0  and 0>β , if )1,0(∈ρ . 
In addition, one can verify that: 
 
(26) β<=β=β=β 0)T()z()0(  
 
for every z and T such that ∞<<< Tz0  and 0>β , if 0=ρ . 
Finally, it is easy to show that: 
 
(27) β=β=β=β )T()z()0(   
 
for every z and T such that ∞<<< Tz0  and 0>β , if 1=ρ . 
 
3.5 Numerical example 
As a matter of example, we use the adjustment model (14) to compute returns to 
schooling in terms of both potential and observed earnings using our preferred estimates 
in Table 1 (GMM-SYS, controlling for year effects).  
                                                 
7 Note that β=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
ρ−−ρβ )1(1
1 .  
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Using expression (24), it is easy to calculate that the return to schooling in terms of 
potential earnings )(∞β , the equivalent of the static β  return in the standard Mincer 
model (11), is equal to 0.053, 0.089 and 0.093 in Denmark, Finland and Belgium, 
respectively.  
In addition, we can use expression (22) to calculate the average return to schooling in 
terms of observed earnings over the working life )z(β . As shown in Figure 1 (the 
horizontal axis measures potential labor-market experience z), the standard static 
Mincerian model would not capture the fact that the return to schooling is increasing 
over time at the beginning of the working life and that the actual return to schooling at 
labor-market entry )0(β  (estimated at 0.031, 0.062 and 0.070 in Denmark, Belgium and 
Finland, respectively) may be well below the potential one ( )(∞β ).          
Since a dynamic version of the Mincer equation seems sufficiently robust on the 
empirical ground, the next step consists of discussing its possible theoretical 
foundations. Specifically, the next section shows that a dynamic Mincer equation can be 
obtained as the solution of a simple wage-bargaining model.    
 
4. Bargaining model 
 
From a theoretical point of view, assumption (10) fits within the perfect-competition 
framework where the nominal wage equals the monetary value of the marginal labor 
productivity. However, if one believes that the imperfect-competition framework is a 
more realistic view of the labor market8, then several arguments can support the 
statement that assumption (10) is unlikely to hold. This section focuses on one of the 
possible arguments: the existence of wage bargaining at worker-employer level. Some 
possible criticisms are discussed in the next section of this paper.  
The standard Mincerian model puts emphasis on the supply side: the more an individual 
invests in his human-capital development, the higher his wage is. The model that is 
presented in this section aims at enhancing the role played by demand factors in 
determining wages, without diminishing the one played by supply factors. More 
explicitly, the argument is that schooling and post-schooling investments provide 
individuals with net potential earnings, meaning skills required to earn a given amount 
of money. However, observed earnings are likely to be the result of both worker’s skills 
(supply) and employer’s willingness to pay (demand). Since real-life labor markets are 
characterized by wage bargaining, the possibility of a margin-formation between 
observed earnings and net potential earnings should not be ruled out a-priori. This 
implies that observed earnings may not coincide with net potential earnings at any time, 
although the former generally depend on the latter.      
As additional feature, the model keeps into account the stylized fact that observed 
earnings exhibit path-dependence (persistence). To the best of our knowledge, this 
feature is novel because the existing (micro and macro) evidence on the autoregressive 
nature of observed earnings9 has not received attention in Mincerian studies so far. 
To anticipate the model’s conclusion, current observed earnings are shown to be 
dependent on both past observed earnings and current net potential earnings. 
 
Let us assume that the logarithm of the observed earnings of a worker arises from a 
simple, decentralized Nash bargaining between a worker and an employer and that: 
 
                                                 
8 A general reference is the New Keynesian view of the labor market. 
   
9 See Taylor (1999) for a good survey.  
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• Worker objective function: the worker maximizes his observed earnings at time 
t10, namely the worker maximizes t
w
t wlnU =  
 
• Employer objective function: the employer maximizes the difference between 
the monetary value of the worker’s  net productivity at time t and the salary that 
he has to pay to the worker, namely the employer maximizes 
tt
e
t wlnnpelnU −=  
 
• Worker outside option: if bargaining fails, the outside option for the worker 
depends of whether he is employed or unemployed and, in case he is employed, 
on whether he bargains with his own employer or not:  
 
Case 1) if the worker is employed at time 1t − , bargains with his own employer 
at time t and bargaining fails, then the outside option for the worker at time t is 
the unemployment benefit b at time t, i.e. t
w
t blnU
~ =  
Case 2) if the worker is employed at time 1t − , bargains with an employer 
different from his own employer at time t and bargaining fails, then the outside 
option for the worker at time t is the salary that he receives from his own 
employer at time t, i.e. t
w
t w~lnU
~ = .  
Case 3) if the worker is unemployed at time 1t − , bargains with an employer at 
time t and bargaining fails, then the outside option for the worker at time t is the 
unemployment benefit b at time t, i.e. t
w
t blnU
~ =  
Case 4) if the worker has never been employed, bargains with an employer at 
time t and bargaining fails, then the outside option for the worker belongs to the 
continuous interval between zero and the miminum wage (depending on the 
generosity of the welfare assistance) because he is not entitled to receive the 
unemployment benefit (he has not paid any unemployment-benefit contribution) 
but may be entitled to receive some welfare aid, unlikely to be above the 
minimum wage11, i.e. t
w
t alnU
~ =  
 
• Employer outside option: if bargaining fails, the outside option for the employer 
is 0U~ et =  because the employer neither gets the monetary value of the worker’s 
net productivity nor pays a salary 
 
• Nash bargaining function: the Nash bargaining function has a Cobb-Douglas 
specification, i.e. ρ−ρ −−= 1etetwtwtt )U~U()U~U(U  
 
As usual in the literature, the coefficient [ ]1,0∈ρ  in the Nash bargaining function is 
interpreted as the bargaining power of the worker, while ρ−1  is the bargaining power 
of the employer. The reason why the bargaining power of the worker is labeled in the 
same way as the speed of adjustment will be clarified after presenting the solution of the 
model, expression (31).  
                                                 
10 Note that both observed and net potential earnings must be measured in logarithms to be consistent 
with the Mincerian assumption (10).  
   
11 We assume 0wln t >  and [ ]tt wln,0aln ∈  where twln is the logarithm of the minimum wage at time t 
and taln  is the logarithm of the welfare aid at time t. 
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The solution of the worker-employer model under case 4) does not lead to a dynamic 
Mincer equation. Note that this is an obvious result. If the worker has never worked, 
past wages cannot affect current wages by definition. Therefore, we will not consider 
case 4) in what follows.   
In addition, note that, since tw~ln is the result of successful bargaining process between 
the worker and an employer under either case 1) or case 3), the only relevant outside 
option for the worker in the model must necessarily be t
w
t blnU
~ = . Let us focus on it.  
The level of the unemployment benefit of an individual usually depends on the whole 
wage history of the individual. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
unemployment benefit is a simple linear function of the worker’s wage history12 starting 
from time s (labor-market entry), i.e. sst2t21t1t wln...wlnwlnbln −−− θ++θ+θ= . 
The solution of the worker-employer bargaining problem under the latter assumption 
provides the following first-order condition: 
 
(28) 
ttsst2t21t1t wlnnpeln
1
wln...wlnwlnwln −
ρ−=θ−−θ−θ−
ρ
−−−
                                                       
 
which, in turn, yields: 
 
(29) tsst2t21t1t npelnwln)1(...wln)1(wln)1(wln ρ+θρ−++θρ−+θρ−= −−−                                 
 
Hence, if the worker has full bargaining power ( 1=ρ ), then expression (29) becomes 
expression (10) and the standard Mincerian model holds. Intuitively, only when the 
worker has full bargaining power, he is actually able to earn all his net potential 
earnings. In this case, the employer is indifferent between employing and not employing 
because 0U~U et
e
t == .   
On the other hand, if the worker has zero bargaining power ( 0=ρ ), then expression 
(29) implies sst2t21t1t wln...wlnwlnwln −−− θ++θ+θ= . In this case, the worker is 
indifferent between working and being unemployed because wt
w
t U
~U = .   
In general, when the bargaining power of the worker is neither null nor full ( 10 <ρ< ), 
replacing expression (9) into (29) yields:  
 
(30) ( )2sst2t21t1t zzswln)1(...wln)1(wln)1(wln φ+δ+β+αρ+θρ−++θρ−+θρ−≈ −−−  
 
or alternatively: 
 
(31) 2432sst2t21t10t zzswln)1(...wln)1(wln)1(wln υ+υ+υ+θρ−++θρ−+θρ−+υ≈ −−−                    
 
                                                 
12 For example, the unemployment benefit today can be seen as the capitalized value of the contributions 
made in the past. For instance, if we define tt wlnτ  as the contribution to the unemployment benefit paid 
at time t ( τ  is the hourly-wage rate of contribution) and r as the nominal interest rate, then the capitalized 
value of the unemployment benefit at time t is given by: 
ss
st
2t2t
2
1t1tt wln)r1(...wln)r1(wln)r1(bln τ+++τ++τ+= −−−−−  
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where the all the υ  coefficients are those defined in section 2. We label model (31) as 
the bargaining model13.   
Note that, under the hypothesis that the surplus of the worker is the pure wage increase 
( 1tt
w
t
w
t wlnwlnU
~U −−=− ), model (31) and model (14) perfectly match. In this case, 
the bargaining power of the worker can be interpreted as a proxy of the speed of 
adjustment and vice-versa. Specifically, the fact that the speed is far from being one 
indicates that the bargaining power of the worker is far from being full and vice-versa. 
In addition, it is worth stressing that expression (31) can also be obtained if one assumes 
that the outside option of the worker is given by his reservation wage reswln , defined as 
the minimum wage-offer for the worker to accept a job, and that the latter is a function 
of the worker’s wage history14. Formally, this means )wln,...,w(lnfwlnU~ s1t
res
t
w
t −== .  
 
Model (31), as it is, cannot be estimated with usually available panel data because it 
requires information about the whole wage history of each individual in the dataset, 
typically not available. However, standard longitudinal datasets usually allow to test for 
the significance of wage lags up to a certain point in the past. Using our dataset, we are 
able to test several possibilities and find that the most appropriate specification of model 
(31) for Belgium and Finland has two significant wage lags while, for Denmark, it has 
just one lagged wage. Additional wage lags are not statistically significant.    
An important issue to be taken into account before estimating model (31) is that the 
model is more suitable to explore data from countries where unemployment benefits are 
actually paid and cover a large share of the working force. To this respect, we would 
like to stress that Boeri and van Ours (2008, p. 283) indicate Belgium, Finland and 
Denmark as the countries with the highest generosity index of unemployment benefit 
adjusted for coverage in a sample of 12 European countries. Besides issues of data 
availability with other countries, the latter is the main reason why these three countries 
have been chosen for the empirical analysis in this paper.      
Note that the number of relevant wage lags (also called wage persistence) may depend 
on the specific way the unemployment-benefit policies are designed in a given country 
(duration, eligibility, administrative rules regarding the determination of the benefit 
level, and so on). As a matter of example, it may be the case that i) recent earnings are 
relatively more important than older earnings for the determination of the benefit level, 
or that ii) just the most recent wages really matter for the benefit. This would imply that 
some of the θ  coefficients in the simple benefit-determination rule assumed in the 
bargaining model may be either i) not statistically different from zero or ii) zero by 
assumption. For instance, if 0i =θ  for st,...,3i −= , then model (31) would just have 
two relevant lagged wages.  
Of course, many other country-level aspects related to labor-market institutions and 
legislation may also explain different degrees of wage persistence. For instance, if the 
share of temporary contracts relative to permanent contracts is higher in country A 
                                                 
13 Apart from the simple theoretical model presented so far, another reason for using a dynamic multiple-
lags wage model is that, unlike the static one, this model keeps into account that the evolution of the wage 
of a worker over time depends, very often, on a multi-period labor contract. This contract can regulate the 
wage increase from one year to another, independently of the accumulation of human capital made by the 
worker. The only thing that determines a given wage at a given point in time is a predetermined rule on 
the wage increase over the next 5, 10 or 20 years, agreed by the worker and the employer when the labor 
contract is signed. Of course, this rule can be affected by the worker’s human capital at the time the 
contract is signed but, afterwards, the agreed rule changes only if a new contract is signed (which means a 
new bargaining).  
 
14 It seems quite reasonable to assume that the reservation wage of a worker depends on his wage history. 
Again, for model (31) to hold, we need to assume simple linear dependence.    
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relative to country B, this may imply a higher number of bargaining processes among 
workers and employers taking place in country A and may affect the persistence of 
wages in country A relative to B. Alternatively, if firing is more costly or difficult in 
country B, this would imply a different outside option of the worker in country B 
relative to A and may affect the relative degree of wage persistence in the two countries.        
Table 2 presents our GMM-SYS estimates based on model (31), controlling for 
endogeneity, individual heterogeneity and year effects. All standard tests are passed and 
their results indicate a specification improvement for Belgium, no real gain with respect 
to the adjustment model for Denmark, some mixed evidence for Finland where the 
second wage lag is significant but the Hansen J test does not significantly improve and 
the 2nd order autocorrelation test shows a lower p-value. 
The main conclusion is that a micro-founded dynamic wage model, the bargaining 
model, can fit the data better than a simple adjustment model but requires more 
(sometimes non-testable) theoretical assumptions. 
 
5. Extended bargaining model   
 
Up to now, we have only used data on wages and human-capital variables because we 
primarily aimed at:  
 
• Testing the equality between the observed wage of an individual and the 
monetary value of his human-capital productivity, assumed by the static Mincer 
model (adjustment model) 
• Documenting that a dynamic Mincer equation, obtained as the solution of a 
simple wage-bargaining model at worker-employer level, is not rejected by the 
data (bargaining model) 
 
In this section, we explore three possible criticisms that are mainly related to the 
theoretical assumptions behind the bargaining model presented in the previous section. 
Eventually, they are extensible to the adjustment model because the latter can be seen as 
a particular case of the bargaining model when the surplus of the worker is the pure 
wage increase from time 1t −  to time t.  
Particularly, we aim at answering the following three questions:  
 
• What if wages are set by collective bargaining? 
• What if the employer is the government? 
• What if a full set of control variables is used? 
 
An important aspect that has not been mentioned so far is that individual wages can be 
set by collective bargaining, i.e. bargaining between unions and employers’ 
associations, rather than by worker-employer direct negotiation. If collective bargaining 
plays a very important role in wage determination, then our simple bargaining model 
may not be very suitable for use, unless one assumes that the surplus of the bargaining 
parties coincides with the surplus of the average worker and of the average employer 
(i.e. the representative union behaves exactly like the representative worker and the 
representative employers’ association behaves exactly like the representative employer). 
Unfortunately, the ECHP dataset does not contain information neither on whether the 
individual wage is set by collective bargaining not on union membership (see also Sanz-
de-Galdeano and Turunen, 2006). So, in order to investigate this potentially important 
issue, we use a publicly-available dataset provided by Verbeek (2008), which has 
information on wages set by collective bargaining.  
 12
The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and 
contain detailed information on 545 male workers from 1980 to 1987, a period of 
decreasing union membership in the United States, but still high unionization compared 
to the last decade. This dataset has been used by Vella and Verbeek (1998) to study 
union-wage premia. On average, 24% of the individuals in the dataset have their wages 
negotiated at collective level but this percentage varies over time because there are 
individuals who change their status over the sample period.   
If our bargaining model is not able to capture the fact that the wages set by collective 
bargaining are set differently, i.e. the process of wage formation through collective 
bargaining cannot be approximated by a simple worker-employer model, we should find 
evidence of a collective-bargaining effect on wages, not captured by the bargaining 
model. That is, if we estimate a bargaining model with a dummy controlling for whether 
wages are set by collective bargaining or not, this dummy should be statistically 
significant (it should contribute to explain wages).  
The collective-bargaining dummy is treated as endogenous because an individual can 
choose to work in a sector or industry where wages are bargained at collective level or 
not, and this choice is likely to be correlated with individual unobserved characteristics.   
Table 3 provides benchmark estimates for the simple dynamic models estimated so far 
with European data. Note that only the bargaining model with three wage lags (the 
fourth is not significant) passes the standard specification tests.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the bargaining model with a collective-
bargaining dummy. For completeness, we also present GMM-SYS estimates for the 
adjustment model, finding that the model does not fit the data well enough because the 
standard tests are not passed. Our preferred estimates are those of the bargaining model 
with three wage lags (the fourth is not significant). In all the specifications, the 
collective-bargaining dummy (equal to 1 if the individual wage is bargained at 
collective level) is not significant, meaning that the bargaining model fits the data well 
even if wages are bargained at collective level.  
The latter is, of course, just evidence based on a particular sample, and the United States 
is not the best country to test our model because collective bargaining is relatively less 
important than in Europe. If anything, we have additional evidence that the bargaining 
model can fit the data well not only in Belgium and Finland but also in the United 
States. 
Another interesting issue, not investigated so far, is that the employer of a worker can 
be the government, that is, an individual can work in the public sector rather than in the 
private sector of the economy. If we focus on the public sector, the assumption that the 
employer maximizes profits (regardless of how they are defined), made in the 
bargaining model, can be inappropriate. Consequently, the bargaining model can be 
unable to properly fit the data in countries where the share of the public-sector 
employment is important or, empirically, if many individuals in the sample work in 
public sector.      
Likewise the collective-bargaining effect, if the bargaining model is not able to capture 
the fact that, when the employer is the government, wages are set differently, we should 
observe a public-sector effect on wages, not captured by the bargaining model presented 
in the previous section. That is, if we estimate a bargaining model with a dummy 
controlling for whether an individual works in the public sector or not, this dummy 
should be statistically significant (there should be a share of wage variability explained 
by the dummy). 
The public-sector dummy is treated as endogenous because, likewise the previous case, 
an individual can choose to work in the public sector, and this choice is likely to be 
correlated with individual unobserved characteristics.     
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Table 5 presents the estimation results. They are very similar to those presented in Table 
4. As before, we present GMM-SYS estimates for the adjustment model, finding 
evidence that the model does not fit the data well enough because the standard tests are 
not passed. Again, our preferred estimates are those of the bargaining model with three 
wage lags (the fourth is not significant). In all the specifications, the public-sector 
dummy (equal to 1 if the individual works in the public sector) is found to be not 
significant, meaning that the bargaining model fits the data well even if the employer is 
not a profit-maximizing private firm or organization. 
For completeness, in Table 6, we also present estimates of the bargaining model with 
both collective-bargaining and public-sector dummy. They are found to be not jointly 
significant in all the specifications.    
Going back to the theoretical foundations of our bargaining model, the reason for not 
observing neither a collective-bargaining effect nor a public-sector effect can be that, 
ultimately, the fundamental individual behaviors of the bargaining model still work 
even if the wage is bargained at collective level or the employer is the government. The 
choice of keeping a job paid a certain amount, or not, is made by the worker. So, if a 
worker believes that the wage offer is too low (given his human-capital investment and 
his wage history), he does not accept the job and we do not observe him in the data. If 
he keeps the job, it is because the wage is high enough to satisfy the condition 
w
t
w
t U
~U > . Analogously, if a profit-maximizing employer offers a job paid a certain 
amount, it is because et
e
t U
~U > . Therefore, if the Government wants to hire an 
individual with certain human-capital skills and a certain wage history, the wage offer 
must be consistent with the one potentially made by a private employer. This may 
explain why we do not observe a public-sector effect (after controlling for human 
capital, wage lags and individual unobserved heterogeneity). On the other hand, if the 
wage is determined at collective level, and both unions and employers’ associations care 
about employment, the equilibrium wage cannot be very different from the one that 
would result from a decentralized bargaining process. This may explain why we do not 
observe a collective-bargaining effect.       
Since the formation of individual wages is a rather-complex phenomenon, there may be 
other determinates of wages that are not kept into account by our simple bargaining 
model. As a matter of example, it could be argued that the model does not take into 
account whether the worker is black or hispanic, and that race matters in the labor 
market. So, the last part of this section investigates what happens if we extend the 
bargaining model using a full set of covariates in order to control for potentially 
important determinates of wages, other than those considered so far. Specifically, we 
control not only for collective bargaining and public sector but also for race, marriage, 
health, residence, private-sector industry and occupation. We use dummies equal to one 
if the individual is black, hispanic, married, has health disabilities, lives in south, 
northern central, north east, or in a rural area. In addition, we distinguish between 
eleven industries (agriculture, mining, construction and so on) and nine different 
occupations (professionals, managers, sales workers and so on). All the covariates that 
are individual-choice variables are considered endogenous (public sector, collective 
bargaining, marriage, residence, private-sector industry and occupation) while the 
remaining ones are taken as exogenous (race and health).   
The results in Table 7 show that the standard tests are passed in all the specifications. 
Looking at the big picture, we observe that wage history matters, that human capital is 
important, and that the remaining covariates are not significant. In our preferred 
specification, the bargaining model with three significant wage lags15 (note that there 
are higher p-values for the Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorrelation test and for the 
                                                 
15 The fourth lag is not significant.  
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Hansen test), the only covariate that is significant at 5% level is the dummy for black, 
meaning that the bargaining model is unable to take into account some kind of wage 
discrimination for black males. However, this race-discrimination result is not 
confirmed neither by the adjustment model not by the bargaining model with two wage 
lags.   
Therefore, to really conclude this section, it is worth stressing that a simple bargaining 
model can provide a very good fit of earnings data, even in its very simple formulation. 
Once individual (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, 
controlling for individual observed characteristics other than wage history and human 
capital may not radically improve the model specification.      
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The main conclusions of this paper are the following:  
 
a. The equality between the observed wage of an individual and the monetary 
value of his net human-capital productivity (the so-called net potential wage), 
assumed by the standard Mincerian model, is rejected by the ECHP data for 
Belgium, Denmark and Finland 
 
b. A dynamic approach to the Mincer equation based on a simple wage adjustment 
model implies that the return to schooling in terms of observed earnings is not 
independent of labor-market experience 
 
c. The return to schooling in terms of net potential earnings, provided by the 
standard Mincer equation, can also be computed using a dynamic wage 
adjustment model 
 
d. A dynamic adjustment model allows the estimation of the average return to 
schooling at labor-market entry 
 
e. A dynamic wage equation can be seen as the solution of a simple wage 
bargaining model where the role played by demand factors is enhanced with 
respect to the standard supply-side Mincerian framework 
 
f. A micro-founded dynamic wage model, the bargaining model, can fit both 
European and US data better than a simple adjustment model but requires more 
theoretical assumptions 
 
g. Individual wages are well explained by a simple worker-employer bargaining 
model even if they are negotiated at collective level, the employer is the 
government, and the dataset does not allow to control for a large set of 
covariates.        
 
The rest of this section discusses the above results in the light of the existing literature 
on human-capital wage equations, with special emphasis on result b. which we consider 
the most important (although it is a consequence of result a.)   
 
The seminal book by Mincer (1974) has been the starting point of a large body of 
literature dealing with the estimation of a wage equation where the logarithm of the 
hourly wage of an individual is explained by his schooling years, potential labor-market 
experience, and experience squared. Within this framework, the coefficient of schooling 
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years is usually interpreted as being the return to an additional year of schooling in 
terms of observed earnings.  
An excellent synthesis of the research papers adopting the Mincer equation as 
underlying framework has been provided by Card (1999). The reviewed works 
generally focused on the estimation of the average impact of schooling on earnings, by 
means of both OLS and instrumental-variable techniques.  
Today, ‘the state of the art’ described by Card looks outdated. This is partly because the 
last decade was characterized by a special interest in adopting the Mincer equation for 
identifying the effect of schooling not only on the mean but also on the shape of the 
conditional wage distribution, using the quantile-regression techniques due to Koenker 
and Bassett (1978). Starting from a seminal work by Buchinsky (1994), the last few 
years saw the publication of numerous estimates of the schooling coefficient along the 
conditional wage distribution, with the frequent finding that education has a positive 
impact on within-groups wage inequality, as suggested by Martins and Pereira (2004) 
among others. Additional results using instrumental-variable techniques for quantile 
regression have been provided by Arias et al. (2001), Chernozhukov and Hansen 
(2006), Lee (2007), Andini (2008), and many others. 
In spite of its wide acceptance within the profession, the spread of the framework 
developed by Mincer over the last forty years has not been uncontroversial. Some 
authors criticized the Mincerian framework by arguing that the framework is not able to 
provide a good fit of empirical data; some stressed that the average effect of schooling 
on earnings is likely to be non-linear in schooling; some suggested that education levels 
should replace schooling years in the wage equation. For instance, Murphy and Welch 
(1990) maintained that the standard Mincer equation provides a very poor 
approximation of the true empirical relationship between earnings and experience, while 
Trostel (2005) argued that the average impact of an additional year of schooling on 
earnings varies with the number of completed schooling years.     
In summary, there have been some critical voices but, looking at the big picture, we 
must reasonably conclude that the history of human-capital regressions has been 
characterized by a generalized attempt of consistently estimating the coefficient of 
schooling (both on average and along the conditional wage distribution), under an 
implicit acceptance of the theoretical interpretation of the schooling coefficient itself. 
Nevertheless, the important issue of the theoretical interpretation of the schooling 
coefficient has been recently rediscovered by Heckman et al. (2005), who empirically 
tested several implications of the classical Mincerian framework, using Census data for 
the United States. Among other implications of the Mincerian approach, the authors 
tested and often rejected the implication that the return to schooling in terms of 
observed earnings is independent of labor-market experience. 
On the lines of Heckman et al. (2005), our paper has provided additional theoretical and 
empirical arguments against the usual interpretation of the coefficient of schooling in 
the standard Mincer equation. Indeed, we have argued that the return to schooling in 
terms of observed earnings is, in general, dependent of labor-market experience (result 
b.). This result is also consistent with more recent empirical evidence provided Belzil 
(2007) and with some earlier evidence presented by Andini (2005)16.  
As shown, the result b. can be easily derived from a dynamic specification of the 
Mincer equation where past observed earnings contribute to explain current observed 
earnings. This specification is supported by the ECHP data for three European 
countries, once endogeneity, individual heterogeneity and time effects are accounted for 
                                                 
16 Some of the ideas that are presented in this paper can also be found in Andini (2007), Andini (2009) 
and Andini (forthcoming). However, these works do not use GMM techniques in the estimation of the 
dynamic Mincer equation. 
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(result a.), and allows to compute the return to schooling at labor-market entry (result 
d.) as well as the standard Mincerian return to schooling (result c.).     
This paper also provides a theoretical micro-foundation of a dynamic Mincer equation, 
where demand factors are considered as important as supply factors for wage 
determination (result e.). It is worth stressing that, of course, we do not claim for 
generality. Clearly, the bargaining model in section 4 holds under a set of specific 
assumptions. The main issue, at this point, is whether these assumptions bring us closer 
to reality (enhanced role of demand factors in determining wages) or not. The 
bargaining model is presented here as a micro-founded alternative to the simple 
adjustment model. The former can perform better than the latter in terms of data fitting 
because it allows for more than one wage lag but it is based on more theoretical 
hypotheses (result f.). Finally, we find that the bargaining model can provide a good fit 
of the data even in its very simple formulation (result g.), i.e. wage history + human 
capital.      
Summing up, to really conclude this paper, we would like to stress that there seems to 
be substantial empirical evidence supporting the argument that past observed earnings, 
together with accumulated human capital (schooling and post-schooling investments), 
play an important role in explaining current observed earnings. This finding should 
open the door to new research efforts looking for alternative, and perhaps more general, 
theoretical foundations of a dynamic Mincer equation. Issues related to asymmetric 
information (for instance, the case where the employer does not observe the net 
potential earnings of the worker), role of unions (insider-outsider considerations) and 
efficiency wages (the employer cannot observe the worker’s effort) are interesting 
topics for future investigation. 
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Table 1. Adjustment model (ECHP) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Belgium Denmark Finland 
 1994-2001 1994-2001 1996-2001 
    
OLS    
Constant 1.223 (0.000) 0.983 (0.000) 1.193 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.757 (0.000) 0.775 (0.000) 0.627 (0.000) 
Schooling years 0.016 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.023 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.005 (0.001) 0.001 (0.562) 0.007 (0.018) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.168) -0.000 (0.787) -0.000 (0.288) 
    
OLS, controlling for year effects    
Constant 1.252 (0.000) 0.948 (0.000) 1.179 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.754 (0.000) 0.772 (0.000) 0.624 (0.000) 
Schooling years 0.016 (0.000) 0.010 (0.000) 0.025 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.006 (0.000) 0.002 (0.493) 0.008 (0.014) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.094) -0.000 (0.684) -0.000 (0.308) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant 2.102 (0.000) 1.740 (0.000) 2.005 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.443 (0.000) 0.543 (0.000) 0.305 (0.016) 
Schooling years 0.073 (0.000) 0.017 (0.001) 0.051 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.022 (0.000) 0.027 (0.003) 0.016 (0.126) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.116) -0.000 (0.011) -0.000 (0.725) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.065) (0.041) (0.510) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.030) (0.552) (0.006) 
    
GMM-SYS, controlling for year effects    
Constant 2.901 (0.000) 2.145 (0.000) 2.109 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.335 (0.000) 0.420 (0.000) 0.218 (0.085) 
Schooling years 0.062 (0.000) 0.031 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.032 (0.000) 0.028 (0.006) 0.014 (0.188) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.922) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.121) (0.117) (0.493) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.256) (0.738) (0.127) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on White-corrected standard errors for OLS 
and on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors for GMM-SYS.  
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Table 2. Bargaining model (ECHP) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Belgium Denmark Finland 
 1994-2001 1994-2001 1996-2001 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant 0.815 (0.007) 2.071 (0.000) 1.248 (0.006) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.574 (0.000) 0.499 (0.000) 0.342 (0.020) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2) 0.169 (0.000) -0.014 (0.870) 0.280 (0.000) 
Schooling years 0.044 (0.000) 0.018 (0.014) 0.022 (0.088) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.011 (0.024) 0.021 (0.073) 0.008 (0.351) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.340) -0.000 (0.129) -0.000 (0.689) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.723) (0.516) (0.284) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.519) (0.226) (0.120) 
    
GMM-SYS, controlling for year effects    
Constant 1.607 (0.000) 2.648 (0.000) 1.316 (0.003) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.511 (0.000) 0.409 (0.000) 0.296 (0.050) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2) -0.130 (0.000) -0.092 (0.324) 0.228 (0.001) 
Schooling years 0.033 (0.002) 0.032 (0.000) 0.043 (0.023) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.016 (0.002) 0.026 (0.073) 0.010 (0.266) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.000 (0.048) -0.000 (0.144) 0.000 (0.794) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.978) (0.407) (0.262) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.730) (0.682) (0.145) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
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Table 3. Simple dynamic models (US-NLSY) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Adjustment 
model 
(AR1) 
Bargaining 
model 
(AR2)  
Bargaining 
model 
(AR3) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant -0.230 (0.134) -0.305 (0.025) -0.425 (0.011) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.315 (0.000) 0.369 (0.000) 0.337 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2)  0.172 (0.000) 0.169 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-3)   0.060 (0.004) 
Schooling years 0.091 (0.000) 0.074 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.061 (0.000) 0.042 (0.005) 0.049 (0.018) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.001 (0.010) -0.001 (0.203) -0.001 (0.204) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.001) (0.144) (0.462) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.001) (0.047) (0.481) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
 
 
 22
Table 4. Testing collective-bargaining effect (US-NLSY) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Adjustment 
model 
(AR1) 
Bargaining 
model 
(AR2)  
Bargaining 
model 
(AR3) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant -0.239 (0.122) -0.328 (0.018) -0.442 (0.012) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.317 (0.000) 0.369 (0.000) 0.335 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2)  0.174 (0.000) 0.170 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-3)   0.059 (0.005) 
Schooling years 0.091 (0.000) 0.075 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.061 (0.000) 0.042 (0.005) 0.049 (0.018) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.195) -0.001 (0.200) 
Collective bargaining 0.009 (0.899) 0.036 (0.548) 0.033 (0.683) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.001) (0.139) (0.467) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.011) (0.127) (0.608) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
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Table 5. Testing public-sector effect (US-NLSY) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Adjustment 
model 
(AR1) 
Bargaining 
model 
(AR2)  
Bargaining 
model 
(AR3) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant -0.239 (0.118) -0.299 (0.027) -0.428 (0.012) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.319 (0.000) 0.370 (0.000) 0.334 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2)  0.172 (0.000) 0.166 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-3)   0.057 (0.005) 
Schooling years 0.091 (0.000) 0.074 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.063 (0.000) 0.044 (0.003) 0.051 (0.014) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.144) -0.001 (0.169) 
Public sector  -0.145 (0.228) -0.110 (0.205) -0.055 (0.393) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.001) (0.141) (0.450) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.002) (0.035) (0.134) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
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Table 6. Testing both collective-bargaining and public-sector effect (US-NLSY) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Adjustment 
model 
(AR1) 
Bargaining 
model 
(AR2)  
Bargaining 
model 
(AR3) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant -0.270 (0.084) -0.347 (0.014) -0.475 (0.008) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.320 (0.000) 0.369 (0.000) 0.330 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2)  0.175 (0.000) 0.168 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-3)   0.056 (0.006) 
Schooling years 0.092 (0.000) 0.075 (0.000) 0.082 (0.000) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.063 (0.000) 0.046 (0.002) 0.053 (0.011) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.129) -0.001 (0.154) 
Collective bargaining 0.047 (0.526) 0.076 (0.208) 0.077 (0.313) 
Public sector  -0.173 (0.159) -0.147 (0.107) -0.106 (0.157) 
    
Test of joint significance - dummies   (0.365) (0.215) (0.342) 
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.001) (0.134) (0.446) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.028) (0.196) (0.405) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
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Table 7. Using full set of covariates (US-NLSY) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross hourly wage Adjustment 
model 
(AR1) 
Bargaining 
model 
(AR2)  
Bargaining 
model 
(AR3) 
    
GMM-SYS    
Constant 0.038 (0.928) 0.212 (0.540) 0.251 (0.483) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-1) 0.180 (0.000) 0.264 (0.000) 0.235 (0.000) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-2)  0.111 (0.000) 0.097 (0.001) 
Logarithm of gross hourly wage (-3)   0.048 (0.082) 
Schooling years 0.087 (0.002) 0.043 (0.055) 0.047 (0.055) 
Potential labor-market experience 0.067 (0.000) 0.057 (0.001) 0.071 (0.001) 
Potential labor-market experience squared -0.002 (0.015) -0.001 (0.047) -0.002 (0.088) 
Collective bargaining  0.135 (0.110) 0.215 (0.007) 0.144 (0.103) 
Public sector  -0.029 (0.841) 0.036 (0.777) 0.023 (0.872) 
Married 0.070 (0.135) 0.048 (0.262) 0.023 (0.616) 
Black -0.354 (0.316) -0.225 (0.485) -0.631 (0.024) 
Hispanic 0.212 (0.503) -0.311 (0.156) -0.261 (0.298) 
Health disabilities  -0.081 (0.309) -0.122 (0.124) -0.135 (0.135) 
South -0.340 (0.078) -0.059 (0.672) -0.195 (0.220) 
Northern central -0.418 (0.037) -0.186 (0.242) -0.134 (0.424) 
North east -0.019 (0.928) -0.022 (0.907) 0.096 (0.661) 
Rural area -0.127 (0.145) -0.090 (0.258) -0.124 (0.144) 
Agriculture -0.016 (0.943) -0.118 (0.575) 0.071 (0.760) 
Mining  0.374 (0.119) 0.397 (0.080) 0.388 (0.097) 
Construction 0.212 (0.212) 0.249 (0.158) 0.201 (0.279) 
Trade 0.083 (0.498) 0.112 (0.373) 0.079 (0.557) 
Transportation -0.067 (0.707) 0.058 (0.729) 0.036 (0.847) 
Finance 0.514 (0.001) 0.447 (0.002) 0.295 (0.096) 
Business and repair services 0.160 (0.262) 0.073 (0.574) 0.132 (0.327) 
Personal services 0.196 (0.422) 0.045 (0.861) 0.230 (0.353) 
Entertainment 0.059 (0.826) 0.060 (0.798) 0.208 (0.439) 
Manufacturing 0.126 (0.281) 0.115 (0.307) 0.125 (0.292) 
Professional and related services (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
Professionals, technical and kindred 0.252 (0.033) 0.232 (0.040) 0.095 (0.422) 
Managers, officials and proprietors   0.040 (0.743) 0.108 (0.362) -0.014 (0.904) 
Sales workers 0.020 (0.889) 0.043 (0.759) -0.089 (0.569) 
Clericals and kindred -0.061 (0.601) 0.027 (0.814) 0.006 (0.958) 
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred 0.105 (0.368) -0.023 (0.845) -0.166 (0.194) 
Operatives and kindred 0.012 (0.905) -0.025 (0.825) -0.052 (0.647) 
Laborers and farmers 0.198 (0.135) -0.022 (0.869) -0.105 (0.482) 
Farm laborers and foremen -0.376 (0.257) -0.038 (0.895) -0.476 (0.151) 
Service workers (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
    
Arellano-Bond 1st order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond 2nd order autocorr. test (p-value) (0.271) (0.254) (0.751) 
Hansen J overid. test (p-value) (0.127) (0.363) (0.589) 
 
P-values of estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.  
  
 
 26
Figure 1. Returns to schooling in terms of observed earnings )z(β  
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Appendix. Sample descriptive statistics for ECHP data  
 
The data for Belgium, Denmark and Finland are extracted from the European Community Household 
Panel. We focus on male workers aged between 18 and 65. In order to derive the variables for schooling 
years (ys), potential labour-market experience (plme) and the logarithm of the gross hourly wage (lnw), 
we use the following ECHP variables:  
 
• pt023. Age when the highest level of general or higher education was completed  
• pe039. How old were you when you began your working life, that is, started your first job or 
business? 
• pd003. Age  
• pi211mg. Current wage and salary earnings – gross (monthly) 
• pe005. Total number of hours per week (in main + additional jobs)   
 
Specifically, to be consistent with the standard Mincerian model (the representative agent first stops 
schooling and then starts working), we select a sample of individuals whose age at the completion of the 
highest level of education was not higher than the age at the start of the working life (pt023 ≤ pe039) and 
define the above-referred variables as follows: 
  
• ys = pt023 – 6  
• plme = pd003 – ys – 6 
 
It is worth stressing that ys numbers do not necessarily reflect successfully completed years of schooling. 
This is a compromise that allows us to obtain homogenous measures of schooling years (and potential 
labour-market experience) across three countries that are different in many aspects including educational 
systems.     
The variable lnw represents the natural logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage. From the gross 
monthly wage (pi211mg), we obtain the daily (dividing the monthly wage by 30) and the weekly wage 
(multiplying the daily wage by 7). Dividing the latter by the number of weekly hours of work (pe005), we 
obtain the hourly wage. 
 
       
Belgium, 1994-2001     
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnw 6873 6.164 0.433 2.815 8.697 
ys 6873 13.858 3.240 4 25 
plme 6873 19.521 10.362 0 51 
      
Denmark, 1994-2001     
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnw 2053 4.811 0.521 -0.326 6.368 
ys 2053 14.943 4.592 6 29 
plme 2053 17.173 11.486 0 52 
      
Finland, 1996-2001     
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnw 2341 4.256 0.509 -0.405 7.522 
ys 2341 15.423 3.355 5 27 
plme 2341 14.800 9.999 0 46 
 
